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Corporations are social organizations “midway between the state and the 
individual, owing their existence to the latter’s need of organization and the 




“As the saying goes, a corporation will never truly be a citizen until you 
can execute one in Texas.”
2
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Corporations have been a part of civilized society for several hundred 
years, even though their structure and purpose have changed significantly 
during that time.
3
  In the United States, the nexus for the shift from fewer 
corporations to a broader and transformative corporate existence was the 
advent of the industrial revolution.
4
  This shift gathered more power, and 
this growth occurred, in an environment where “the ability to create by 
charter an abstract, indestructible, immortal and to some degree 
irresponsible entity that could gather the savings of a community or a 
nation and pour them into immense works . . . alter[ed] the character of the 
business system more than any other change of this period.”
5
  Thus, 
corporations have evolved to become complex organisms imbued with 
personhood, institutional structure, and state-like qualities that have an 
encompassing impact on our society.  In situating the corporation within its 
multitude of identities, employing theory that transcends any single 
component of social ordering in favor of a macro view that still 
incorporates micro level assessments can provide clarity.  Vulnerability 
theory can provide such clarity by situating the corporation within the 
vulnerability framework with respect to corporation as “subject,” 
corporation as “institution,” and corporation as “state,” and illuminating 
fault lines and conflicts in and among those dependencies, resilience, and 
the responsive state. 
                                                 
 1.  CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY:  POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY, at 2-3 (Warren J. 
Samuels and Arthur S. Miller eds. 1987) (quoting John P. Davis, CORPORATIONS:  A 
STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF 
THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (Abram Chayes, ed., 1961)).   





 3.  CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 2. 
 4.   Id.  
 5.  Id. (quoting Thomas C. Cochran, BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE: A HISTORY, 76 
(1972)).   
2
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In considering corporate vulnerability fault lines are bound to appear 
because vulnerability, while universal, is not similarly experienced.  Thus, 
considering how to react to conflicting vulnerabilities becomes just as 
important as identifying them in the first instance.  Consider the 
corporation; it is a legal fiction.  It is simultaneously a subject in that it has 
been identified as a person for legal purposes and an institution as it is both 
an entity through which resilience is built for certain constituencies and an 
entity through which the state has chosen to provide resilience to 
vulnerable subjects.  As both legal subject and institution, a corporation 
would seem to have conflicting loyalties and responsibilities.  Add to this 
the fact that the corporation itself is managed and driven by individuals 
who are vulnerable and positioned differently within the corporate structure 
in terms of resilience. The corporation, as an artificial construct, represents 
protection and resilience for a wholly different group of vulnerable subjects 
whose vulnerability may be at odds with those whom the state seeks to 
protect through the corporate form.  When differing, perhaps even 
competing, constituencies seek to both provide and retain certain assets or 
privileges, for example access to health care versus religious freedom, a 
hierarchical ordering occurs which can both diminish the effectiveness of a 
responsive state and have lasting impacts on how we navigate our private 
and public spheres. 
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act
6
 (“Affordable Care Act”).
7
  The main purpose of the Affordable Care 
Act was to provide better access to healthcare for unprotected and 
underserved populations.
8
  The Affordable Care Act was also intended to 
provide for more comprehensive federal regulation of health insurance, 
including the prohibition of lifetime and annual limits and other coverage 
protections.
9
  The Affordable Care Act expanded the type of health care 
that was available to women, including broader access to contraception and 
preventive care.
10
  The main vehicle for providing more access to 
                                                 
 6.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18121 
(2012) [hereinafter “Affordable Care Act]. 
 7.  The Affordable Care Act was signed into law by President Barack Obama on 
March 23, 2010. Key Features of the Affordable Care Act, HHS.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/timeline/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
 8.  Seema Mohapatra, Time to Lift the Veil of Inequality in Health-Care 
Coverage: Using Corporate Law to Defend the Affordable Care Act, 50 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 137, 140 (2015). 
 9.  Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 306 (2014). 
 10.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014); see 
Sepper, supra note 9, at 306-07. 
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healthcare was through insurance offered by employers, as many people 
already obtain health insurance through the workplace.
11
 
In the Supreme Court’s 2014 case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the religious 
beliefs of the persons who owned Hobby Lobby, which is a for-profit, 
closely held corporation, were privileged and protected by the Supreme 
Court over an identified need to deliver contraceptive health services to 
female employees of that corporation.
12
 The finding that the corporation as 
a “person” had the right to assert religious beliefs that reflected those of the 
owners of the corporation impacted the efficacy of the corporation as an 
institution through which the state had chosen to deliver health care 
services to society at large, exposing the vulnerability, not only of those 
employees, but of the corporation, and the state. 
As a result of Hobby Lobby, and the seemingly expanding notion of the 
corporation as a person within the traditional autonomous rights paradigm, 
a tension has developed between corporation as subject and corporation as 
institution.  This evolution of corporation as person also highlights the 
problem of providing resilience to vulnerable subjects whose competing 
vulnerabilities are situated in the same corporate environment.  Addressing 
this issue is of critical importance where employment has become the 
conduit for the responsive state to provide resilience to so many subjects, as 
well as the site of social institution building because the nature of our 
workplace has changed so dramatically.
13
  What level of personification of 
the corporate form is necessary for it to function properly and provide 
optimal resilience and where does that personification cross the line into an 
area that leaves employees, the corporation, and the state too vulnerable?  
                                                 
 11.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762; see also W. David Koeninger, Removing 
Access to Health Care from Employer and State Control: The ACA as Anti-
Subordination Legislation, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 201, 211 (2015):   
The ACA proposed
 
to do several things that would challenge the path 
dependence of our health care system: expanding Medicaid and changing its 
eligibility methodology to a purely financial one; requiring large employers to 
provide health insurance to their employees or face a fine; and creating 
subsidized health care exchanges that would enable individuals to purchase 
affordable health insurance independently of the terms and conditions of their 
employment.
 
 It also proposed to invade the employer’s prerogative to 
determine which benefits it would provide to its employees by mandating that 
large employers include specific items of preventive care in their benefits 
packages. 
 12.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785. 
 13.  See generally CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 
supra note 1 at 115; Jonathan Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work: A New 
Perspective on the Employment At-Will Debate, 43 SW. L. REV. 275, 295 (2013) 
[hereinafter Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work]. 
4
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Is there a way to resolve these conflicts or to negotiate these fault lines in 
and among competing vulnerabilities in a way that makes sense? 
This article will seek to take a first step into the midst of these 
intersecting fault lines, identifying their cause and considering solutions.  
To do so, the corporation as person will be viewed through a vulnerability 
lens in the context of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Hobby Lobby.  Part II of this Article will provide the vulnerability theory 
framework relevant to this discussion and Part III will explore different 
theories of the corporation as legal subject and address the concept of legal 
personhood.  Having provided both the framework for context, and the 
competing theories of corporation as legal subject, Part IV will review and 
consider the Hobby Lobby decision as well as the religious freedom 
jurisprudence underpinning that decision.  Part V will then consider what 
the role of a responsive state should or could be in light of the current state 
of corporate personhood post-Hobby Lobby. 
II.  VULNERABILITY, DEPENDENCY AND RESILIENCE 
The predominant modern legal framework used to explain the 
intersection between subject, institution, and state has been the autonomous 
legal liberal subject, individual rights, equal protection, and the sameness-
of-treatment paradigm.
14
  Vulnerability theory seeks to replace the 
autonomous legal liberal subject and that rights-based framework with a 
universally vulnerable and dependent subject who requires a responsive 
state to build resilience.
15
  Dependency is envisioned as a fluid concept, 
rolling in peaks and troughs over the lifetime of a subject, touching each 
and every individual at different points in our lives.
16
  It is both universal 
and particular.
17
  In applying this framework, vulnerability conceptualizes 
the state and institutions, both public and private, as providing the requisite 
resilience for a vulnerable subject to successfully navigate her life course.
18
  
Just as individuals are vulnerable, so too are the state and institutions, 
requiring support to provide resilience to vulnerable subjects and to protect 
their own vulnerabilities as well.
19
 
                                                 
 14.  See Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 YALE J. L. & FEM. 1, 2-5 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring 
Equality]. 
 15.  See Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 
EMORY L.J. 251, 263-66 (2011) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive State]. 
 16.  See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 14, at 9-10.  
 17.  See id. at 10. 
 18.  See Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 15, at 255-57. 
 19.  See id. at 256.  
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Vulnerability theory suggests that the problem in the way in which the 
state and society have historically conceived of equality is that the narrow 
confines of sameness of treatment do not sufficiently fill the gaps created 
by “growing inequality in wealth, position and power that we have 
experienced in the United States over the past few decades.”
20
  
Vulnerability theorists do not suggest that autonomy need be abandoned 
with the development of a more responsive state; rather, they suggest that 
we recognize autonomy cannot be “attained without the underlying 
provision of substantial assistance, subsidy, and support” from that 
responsive state and its institutions.
21
  Thus, in order to be truly 
autonomous, every individual requires a responsive state and institution.  
The reality is simply that this responsive, supportive state is often rendered 
invisible by structural privilege and the common presumption that some 
autonomous subjects simply fare better than others because of their 
individual achievements.
22
  Thus, in Professor Fineman’s view, the current 




Vulnerability is the embodiment of a lived experience that is both 
universally and particularly dependent as embedded in its environment and 
the context in which it is situated.
24
  It is also a constant throughout a 
person’s life but may manifest itself differently.
25
  “The most recognized 
differences are found in our embodiment. Human differences are 
manifested across differences in age, gender, race, and we also have 
                                                 
 20.  Id. at 251.  Fineman observes that rather than having any obligation to address 
these inequities, the state here is restrained from interference in “the name of individual 
liberty, autonomy, and paramount principles such as freedom of contract.”; Id. at 251-
52; see also Martha Fineman, Equality, Still Elusive After All These Years, in GENDER 
EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 256 (Joanna Grossman & 
Linda McClain eds., 2009).   
 21.  Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 15, at 260.  
 22.  Suzanne Mettler refers to this phenomenon as the “submerged state.”  See 
generally SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011). Mettler explains that the invisibility 
of certain government subsidies, such as the home mortgage interest deduction, contrasted 
with the highly visible nature of certain programs, such as food stamps, enables the 
perception that the non-poor do not depend on the government in the same way that welfare 
recipients do creating a state that is largely invisible and shrouded by class privilege and 
race. Id.; see also Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State:  Women, Race, Poverty, and 
Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 374 (2014).  
 23.   Ani B. Satz, Animals As Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest-Convergence, 
Hierarchy, and Property, 16 ANIMAL L. 65, 79 (2009). 
 24.  See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 14, at 9-10. 
 25.  See id. at 9-11. 
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different abilities or capabilities.”
26
  But our embedded differences matter 
too, from access to education and health care to food security and safety. 
Dependency itself can be inevitable or derivative.
27
  Inevitable 
dependency is something we all experience at points in our lives; when we 
are infants, when we are ill, as we age, or if we experience disability. This 
type of dependency is both unavoidable and universal.
28
  However, as 
conceived, derivative dependency is neither inevitable nor universal, but it 
is socially imposed through the institutional structure of family, and the 
social construct of gender.
29
  Derivative dependency is most often 
encountered when women are required to care for children or the elderly.
30
 
When a woman is required to become a caregiver, she in turn becomes 
vulnerable and dependent on resources to help manage her vulnerability 
while she cares for another.
31
  Dependency, whether inevitable or 
derivative, creates vulnerability, which must be mitigated by resources 
provided by other individuals, social institutions, or the state.
32
 
And, because both vulnerability and dependency are inevitable, 
universal, and constant, resilience must be obtained from social institutions 
and the state, and as such, a responsive state must seek to find ways to 
build resilience so that dependency can be managed fairly by all 
individuals. In acknowledging that human vulnerability is relational both 
between and among individuals, a responsive state should strive to bridge 
the gap between formal and substantive notions of equality.
33
  The 
relationship between the state and the individual requires that the state 
build resilience among vulnerable and dependent individuals based on their 
vulnerabilities, not simply based on a liberal legal subject that is neither 
embodied nor contextualized. 
While vulnerability theory recognizes the need to create resilience for 
the universal vulnerable subject through state institutions, in order to work, 
it requires that those subjects and natural individuals who make up those 
institutions, who are also vulnerable subjects, both recognize others’ 
vulnerability and seek to build resilience for them.
34
  Carter Dillard argues 
                                                 
 26.  Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work, supra note 13, at 301. 
 27.  See Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 15, at 264. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See id. 
 30.  See id. at 264-65. 
 31.  See id. at 264-65. 
 32.  See id. at 265. 
 33.  CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY:  POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 
255-256. 
 34.  Carter Dillard, Empathy with Animals:  A Litmus Test for Human Legal 
Personhood?, An Uncomfortable Conversation:  Human Use of Animals: A 
7
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that one test for the efficacy of such a society, and the ability to apply 
vulnerability theory effectively, may be the level of empathy expressed for 
others within that society.
35
  In examining our relationship with animals, 
Dillard observes that perhaps our society can only go so far in effectuating 
vulnerability within institutions because of a tension between self-interest 
and empathy.
36
  This becomes a point of reflection when contemplating 
corporations because, as a non-sentient being, asking a corporation to 
exercise empathy seems like an empty gesture.  Rather, corporate actors 
must exercise empathy, but exercising empathy may be difficult given the 
nature of a corporation generally and the duality inherent in a system of 
individuals that is also a collective. 
This institutional assemblage of vulnerable subjects, the collectivist 
nature of such an institution, is one reason why institutions themselves are 
vulnerable.
37
  These institutions are not vulnerable in the same sense as the 
vulnerable subject in that an institution does not live an embodied 
existence, but to the extent such institutions are embedded within society, 
they are vulnerable in ways that are also universal and particular.
38
  For 
example, institutions are vulnerable to privilege in that those individuals 
who direct and manage an institution, whether as part of the state, or in a 
state-like capacity, may receive and retain privilege in a way that causes 




The counterbalance to vulnerability and dependency is resilience.  
Resilience is not something a person is born with, rather it is developed 
over a lifetime.  “Resilience is perceived as necessary to both confront 
life’s challenges and to allow individuals to manage risk and to take 
advantage of life’s opportunities and enjoyments.”
40
  There are five 
                                                 
Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative and Feminist and Legal Theory 
Project Workshop 2012, at 5, 
http://www.heinonline.org.proxy.library.emory.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.peggy/unv
erinf001&id=63&collection=peggy&index=fltpconfwork (available through 
HeinOnline). 
 35.  See id. at 2-5.  Dillard explores this idea through a thick conception of legal 
personhood that contemplates an ideal legal subject that is both human and humane, 
and complies with the law based on an other-regarding perspective as contrasted with 
the traditional legal subject that is seen as “self-regarding,” existing outside the 
contemplated synergy of the ideal legal subject and the law.  
 36.  See id. at 1-6. 
 37.  See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 14, at 12-13. 
 38.  See id. at 19. 
 39.  See id. at 15-17. 
 40.  Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work, supra note 13, at 301. 
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primary asset or resource conferring systems that allow an individual to 
build resilience:  physical or material; human; relational; environmental; 
and existential.
41
  Physical assets are those such as housing, food, 
healthcare, and other resources that support our physical well-being in 
society.
42
  Human assets include training, education, and other supports.
43
  
Relational assets include family, friends, and other social networks in our 
lives throughout our life course.
44
  Environmental assets include our natural 
environment clean air, safe drinking water, plants, trees, animals, and our 
built environment.
45
  Finally, existential assets include religion, philosophy, 
art and culture, those things that provide us emotional support and can 
transcend the tangible.
46
  Each of these assets assist in building resilience to 
vulnerabilities we face over a lifetime that are both embodied and 
embedded. 
A responsive state looks for ways to help build resilience and provide 
substantive equality to all of its members.  Only the state can act for the 
collective benefit of society because it is the only entity to which we all 
belong.
47
  Membership within the state is mandatory and universal for all 
those who exist within it.
48
  Our shared vulnerability and our shared 
membership within the state necessitate an independent state that actively 
regulates and participates in the collective good.  However, in the United 
States, the state is viewed with much more suspicion.  Given our emphasis 
on the market, autonomy, and formal equality, the state is often relegated to 
the role of facilitator rather than regulator.
49
  A responsive state would 
provide basic social goods such as housing, healthcare, and a living wage, 
and create a system whereby individuals could achieve substantive 
equality.
50
  A more passive state would permit the private sphere and the 
market to resolve inequities with little involvement beyond formal equality 
and sameness-of-treatment. 
                                                 
 41.  See PEADAR KIRBY, VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE:  THE IMPACT OF 
GLOBALIZATION 55-72 (2006); Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work, supra note 
13, at 302. 
 42.  See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject at Work, supra note 13, at 301. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See id. 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
263 (2004). 
 48.  See id.  
 49.  See id. at 269-70. 
 50.  See id. at 285. 
9
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III.  CORPORATION AS LEGAL SUBJECT 
A corporation  
is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in the 
contemplation of the law.  Being the creature of the law, it possesses 
only those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either 
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.  These are such as are 
supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.
51
 
A. Corporate Entities and Their Related Rights 
As initially conceived, corporations were meant to support the economy 
and to protect individuals in their business endeavors, creating more 
security in business.  To that end, corporations could sue and be sued, enter 
into contracts, own and possess property, assert a subset of constitutional 
rights, and manage their day-to-day affairs, “but they have never been 
accorded all the rights that individuals possess.”
52
  However, as the 
corporate form has evolved, it has become more than an artificial entity, in 
fact Warren Samuels and Arthur Miller suggest that the modern 
corporation should be viewed “as an economic enterprise, a political 
organization, a sociological community, and a legal entity” that is 
recognizably a “constitutional phenomenon.”
53
 
Scholars have proposed different theories to explain corporate existence.  
The first, the fictional entity theory, contemplates a corporation that is 
merely a creation of the state, prescribed by statute and subject to state 
control.
54
  As a concession of the state, it would be a place where the 
vulnerable subject could build resilience.  As conceived then, a corporation 
could have an affirmative duty to comply with the mandate issued by the 
state as a creature of state law.  In essence, it would be understood that the 
corporation, when given a choice, should mirror the will of the state, and 
not the will of the individuals within the corporation.
55
 
The second theory, the nexus of contract theory, posits that the 
corporation is merely a central hub for a multitude of contractual 
relationships by and between corporate actors and stakeholders, employers, 
                                                 
 51.  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
 52.  Id. at 636, 667-68. 
 53.  CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY:  POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1 at 2. 
 54.  Mohapatra, supra note 8, at 157; see also Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of 
Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 891-
92 (2012). 
 55.  It is somewhat akin to the public school system when considered in this way.  
And, in the context of public education, students and parents’ religious rights have been 
much more strictly limited than in the corporate sphere.   
10
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employees, shareholders, and the like.
56
  This theory would be more in 
keeping with a trees versus forest approach, acknowledging the primacy of 
individual relationships over a separate corporate entity.  However, as 
Professor Mohapatra explains, the theory is criticized because defining the 
boundaries of the corporation becomes particularly difficult and could 
cause problems in defining rights and responsibilities.
57
  However, from a 
vulnerability perspective it would remove one layer of fault lines from the 
web of competing vulnerabilities.  Mohapatra observes that “under the 
nexus of contracts theory, the government’s argument concerning the 
contractual obligations of an employer to an employee is more compelling 
than the corporation’s argument that its religious beliefs against abortion 
are offended by contraceptives that they believe to be abortifacients.”
58
  
Thus, corporate reliance on existential assets may be less compelling than 
under other theories. 
The third theory, perhaps the more familiar, is the real entity theory.  The 
real entity theory views the corporation as a separate, distinct entity—the 
park in which the trees are situated, with its own specifically delineated 
boundaries, rather than the trees themselves.  A corporation is wholly 
separate and apart from those who are connected to and within it.
59
  “The 
real entity theory suggests that as a corporation is separate and apart, the 
corporation has a ‘collective consciousness’ that is separate and apart from 
those who manage its operations. Therefore, it is said that a corporation 
may then be considered a person under the law and entitled to legal rights 
that would naturally flow to any person.”
60
  From a vulnerability 
perspective, the impact of the real entity theory will depend a great deal on 
the type of recognition given to the corporate person and to the state’s need 
to deliver assets through the corporate form as an institution.  Heavy 
reliance on this theory would make resilience-building much more difficult.  
However, it does have the benefit of giving the clearest view of the 




                                                 
 56.  Mohapatra, supra note 8, at 159. 
 57.  Id. at 160. 
 58.  Id. at 162. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  In considering all of these theories of corporate existence, the striking feature 
is that a corporation is really an amalgam of all three theoretical constructs – part 
protective creature of law, part collective, part autonomous being.  Perhaps that is why 
it is difficult to capture its essence and ascribe legal duties and rights in only one way. 
But, the collective consciousness ascribed under real entity theory fails to account for 
the lack of empathy a corporation can show while those vulnerable subjects within the 
11
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Samuels and Miller point to a singular event as the moment at which the 
corporation morphed from an artificial legal entity into a constitutional 
being—the United States Supreme Court’s decision in County of Santa 
Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company
62
 wherein the Justices 
somewhat blithely announced that a corporation was a person.
63
  Then-
Chief Justice Waite, prior to hearing oral argument in this tax assessment 
case, announced: 
 The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the 
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which 
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of 
opinion that it does.
64
   
Thus, corporate personhood was born of pure intuited assumption on behalf 
of the Justices, rather than a reasoned juridical explanation of the shift from 
state institution to constitutional subject.
65
 
In interpreting this assumed personhood, the Supreme Court has had the 
occasion to delineate between property interests and liberty interests of 
                                                 
corporation can individually retain their own empathy.  Reflecting back on Dillard’s 
point about the nature of the state and the individuals within it, perhaps corporate 
personhood suffers some of the same problems with collective empathy in the semi-
public sphere where corporations are necessarily situated. See generally Dillard, supra 
note 34. 
 62.  See 118 U.S. 394, 394-95 (1886). 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See id. at 396. 
 65.  Some scholars have taken the position that this announcement was never 
intended to equate a corporate person with a natural person.  In their Amici Brief to the 
Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby, legal historians and scholars noted:  
Santa Clara was never understood as barring even-handed regulation of 
corporations by the government. Indeed, Justice Field himself never viewed 
corporations in the same light as natural persons. To the contrary, he explained 
in his circuit court decision in Santa Clara that ‘corporations are creatures of 
the state’ and ‘could not exist independently of the law.’ Precisely because 
they were its creatures, the state might prescribe the conditions ‘upon which 
they may be formed and continued.’ That is, the state might regulate the 
activities of these “artificial” persons in the interests of the “natural” persons 
who were its real constituents.   
Brief for Historians and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 
2014 WL 411289 at 13-14. Justice Alito seemingly took the same tack as Justice Field 
when authoring the decision in Hobby Lobby, ignoring the issue of whether a person in 
RFRA could include a corporation for the purpose of protecting religious liberties and 
simply treating that personhood as a given for the purposes of standing under RFRA 
and ignoring the dichotomy between artificial and natural persons.  Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). 
12
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corporations and to more readily define corporate property interests under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
66
  What this has meant is that corporations 
enjoy extensive property rights via the Fourteenth Amendment and that 
Free Speech rights have been extended to corporations in the form of 
commercial speech protection in the marketplace of ideas, but the Supreme 
Court has specifically noted that liberty interests under the Fourteenth 
Amendment inure to natural, not artificial persons.
67
  But, with respect to 
free speech, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the right to free press 
and free speech are of such importance that the speaker itself is irrelevant 
in terms of public speech and the expression of ideas, and this liberty 
interest, unlike others, has been more readily bestowed upon corporations, 
although not without some limitations.
68
  Thus, while this right has been 
extended to corporations, it has been done so in a way that suggests the 
importance of information rather than the rights of the person or entity 
delivering that information. 
In its majority opinion in Bellotti the Supreme Court explained that while 
“[t]he press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized 
role of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering 
criticism, and providing a forum for discussion and debate, . . . the press 
does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to 
enlighten.”
69
  The Court went on to explain that, in a similar manner, its 
“decisions involving corporations in the business of communication or 
                                                 
 66.  See Brief for Historians and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-
354, 13-356), 2014 WL 411289 at 4-5:  
In First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978),
 
then-Justice 
Rehnquist, writing in dissent, noted that [the Supreme] Court historically drew 
a distinction, for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, between the property and 
liberty interests of business corporations. In the decades following the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the corporate “rights” recognized by this Court 
were largely limited to property and contract entitlements, in circumstances 
where the interests of the underlying shareholders or owners so required.   
 67.  See W. Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) (liberty interests 
extend only to natural persons); Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 
(1906) (liberty interest of Fourteenth Amendment applies to natural persons); 
Covington & Lexington Tpk. R.R. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578 (1896); Smyth v. 
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). 
 68.  See Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (Constitution accords a lesser 
protection to commercial speech than to other forms of expression).  Thus, the Court 
has made a distinction between the speech and the speaker when considering pure 
speech versus commercial speech.  
 69.  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781-82. 
13
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entertainment are based not only on the role of the First Amendment in 
fostering individual self-expression, but also on its role in affording the 
public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information 
and ideas.”
70
  Perhaps this liberty interest can still be distinguished between 
corporations and individuals by considering the audience for the speech, 




Conversely, rights seen to be endemic to natural individuals have been 
withheld from corporations, and corporations as entities do not enjoy 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the same way that natural 
individuals do.  Corporations are subject to additional governmental 
regulation that might otherwise invade an individual person’s right to 
privacy.  While corporations may assert Fourth Amendment claims to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, courts have recognized that 
their rights do not extend as far as those of a natural individual.
72
  
Corporations, by their very nature, do not have a concomitant right to 
privacy enjoyed by natural individuals.   
“[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment 
of a right to privacy.  They are endowed with public attributes.  They 
                                                 
 70.  Id. at 783. 
 71.  Interestingly, some states have sought to pass legislation stripping 
constitutional personhood from corporations, clarifying that it is available only to 
natural persons.  As Matambanadzo states:   
Various political interest groups have taken on the cause of repealing 
constitutional corporate personhood, and state and local governments have 
enacted legislation to address the problems raised thereby.  Legislation 
designed to dismantle corporate personhood has been introduced in Montana, 
Vermont and Washington.
 
 On March 8, 2011 in Minnesota, a state 
constitutional amendment for the 2012 general election was introduced that 
would limit the definition of person to natural persons, excluding corporations 
from constitutional personhood.  Similar amendments and initiatives have been 
adopted by other local governments, and proposed by political parties and 
public interests groups.  These proposals either limit free speech rights for 
corporations or actively deny corporations personhood.  At the federal level, 
Congressman Ted Deutch of Florida and Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont 
introduced a constitutional amendment limiting constitutional rights to “natural 
persons” and eliminating constitutional rights for “for-profit corporations, 
limited liability companies, or other private entitles established for business 
purposes.” 
Saru M. Matambanadzo, Embodying Vulnerability: A Feminist Theory of the Person, 
20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, 55-56 (2012). 
 72.  See G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) 
(acknowledging that corporations have Fourth Amendment rights but also recognizing 
that “a business, by its special nature and voluntary existence may open itself to 
intrusions that would not be permissible in a purely private context.”). 
14
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have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the 
privilege of acting as artificial entities.  The Federal Government allows 
them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.  Favors from 
government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.”
73
 
Thus, when considering the reach of the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination, the Court determined that it is reserved to “natural 
individuals” and does not extend to any sort of corporate, collective, or 
representative organization to which that individual might belong.
74
   
[I]ndividuals, when acting as representatives of a collective group . . . 
assume the rights, duties and privileges of the artificial entity or 
association of which they are agents or officers and they are bound by its 
obligations.  In their official capacity, therefore, they have no privilege 
against self-incrimination.  And the official records and documents of the 
organization that are held by them in a representative rather than in a 
personal capacity cannot be the subject of the personal privilege against 




Thus, in drawing a line for corporate personhood, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that some rights belong solely to natural individuals and those 
individual’s rights cannot be appropriated or asserted by the corporation as 
such.
76
  Indeed, corporations have also been denied more discrete personal 
rights, for example, corporations cannot practice medicine because the 
nature of such an exercise is so inherently individual and personal, nor can 
they represent themselves in legal actions.
77
 
                                                 
 73.  United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (citations omitted). 
 74.  See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 
U.S. 43 (1906). 
 75. White, 322 U.S. at 699. 
 76.  See id.  The reason for this, according to the Supreme Court, is simple:   
The scope and nature of the economic activities of incorporated and 
unincorporated organizations and their representatives demand that the 
constitutional power of the federal and state governments to regulate those 
activities be correspondingly effective. The greater portion of evidence of 
wrongdoing by an organization or its representatives is usually to be found in 
the official records and documents of that organization. Were the cloak of the 
privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, 
effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible.  
Id.at 700.  
 77.  See, e.g., Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 688 N.E.2d 106, 107 (Ill. 
1997); Eagle Assoc. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308-09 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(courts have long required corporations to appear through a licensed attorney, not a lay 
person who could otherwise represent themselves).  
15
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B. Duties and Protections for Corporate Actors in the Corporation 
The corporate construct also imposes accountability, to some degree, 
upon those who conduct business on behalf of the corporation.  Generally, 
boards of directors manage corporate affairs and they are deemed to have a 
responsibility to shareholders that is expressed legally as a duty of loyalty 
and a duty of care.
78
  This concept of “shareholder primacy” holds 
individuals who conduct business accountable to those on whose behalf the 
business is being conducted.
79
  These obligations to others within the 
corporate structure are balanced against the business judgment rule, which 
protects corporate actors from liability to those shareholders and other 
stakeholders under certain conditions.
80
 
When applying the business judgment rule, courts prefer to defer to 
corporate decision makers because it encourages informed risk-taking, 
which in turn encourages innovation and growth.
81
  The relationship 
between corporate owners and other stakeholders is not regulated in a 
similar fashion, although in some respects obligations to other stakeholders, 
including employees and the public at large, have entered the corporate 
lexicon more in recent years, particularly in the form of constituency 
statutes.
82
  The shift to recognizing other constituencies in corporate 
governance is important to a vulnerability analysis and may help reframe 
obligations by and between privileged and non-privileged subjects within 
the corporation. 
IV. CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AND RELIGION:  THE IMPACT OF HOBBY 
LOBBY 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that 
                                                 
 78.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141 (2012). 
 79.  See Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes 
Protect Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
765, 770 (2009). 
 80.  See Douglas M. Branson, The Indiana Supreme Court Lecture:  The Rule That 
Isn’t A Rule – The Business Judgment Rule, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 632 (2002). 
 81.  Bisconti, supra note 79 at 775-76. 
 82.  See Tamara C. Belinfanti, Social Good Is Not Inconsistent with Profit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/16/what-are-
corporations-obligations-to-shareholders/social-good-is-not-inconsistent-with-profit.; 
see Bisconti, supra note 79, at 781-82 (discussing the rise and potential benefit of 
constituency statutes).  Constituency statutes generally permit corporate boards to 
consider interests beyond those of their shareholders, considering a more holistic view 
of what is best for the company, in contemplation of more than just the bottom line.  
See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for 
Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579-80 (1992). 
16
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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
83
  Although it is only sixteen words 
and two simple clauses, the Free Exercise Clause has been a point of 
significant interpretive contention for over 200 years.
84
  As Michael 
McConnell explains it, one view is that the clause “protects a specified 
freedom: presumptively, all people may worship God in accordance with 
the dictates of their own conscience, subject only to governmental 
interference necessary to protect the public good.”
85
  But, under a second 
view, “the Free Exercise Clause, like the Equal Protection Clause, protects 
against a particular kind of governmental classification or discrimination: 
the government may not “single out” religion (or any particular religion) 
for unfavorable treatment.”
86
  The distinction is important because, as 
McConnell notes, “the Free Exercise Clause would be of little practical 
importance to the hundreds of sects and millions of religious citizens who 
inhabit this pluralistic and religious nation” if it only protected against 
deliberate discrimination, but a “freedom-protective” version of the clause 
would enable these same groups to effectively protect their religious rights 
from governmental interference.
87
  This push and pull between one view 
and the other can be illustrated by reviewing the Supreme Court decisions 
and Congressional enactments that led to the decision in Hobby Lobby. 
A. Religious Liberties and the Constitution 
For approximately twenty-five years, the test set forth in Sherbert v. 
                                                 
83.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 84.  Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 157 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell, 
Institutions and Interpretation]; see also Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right 
of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 
(1992); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free 
Exercise of Religion].  “The term ‘free exercise’ first appeared in an American legal 
document in 1648, when Lord Baltimore required his new Protestant governor and 
councilors in Maryland to promise not to disturb Christians (“and in particular no 
Roman Catholic”) in the “free exercise” of their religion.”  McConnell, Free Exercise 
of Religion, supra note 84, at 1425. 
 85.  McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 84, at 157 (emphasis in 
original).  
 86.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 87.  Id.  This more expansive view is necessitated in part by the regulatory nature 
of government.  As McConnell observes, “[t]he natural tendency of regulatory regimes 
is to make no exceptions for private concerns and to overinflate the importance of their 
own objectives—even when those private concerns are rooted in constitutional rights 
and accommodation could be made at reasonably low cost to public purposes.” Id. 
17
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Verner
88
 was applied to questions of whether a government regulation 
improperly infringed on an individual’s religious beliefs.
89
  In Sherbert, the 
United States Supreme Court struck down a state statute that disqualified a 
claimant from receiving unemployment benefits because she refused to 
work on her Sabbath.
90
  In drawing on its prior decisions, the Supreme 
Court explained the balance that needed to be struck between free exercise 
of religion and government regulation holding that: 
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any 
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.  Government may 
neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief; nor penalize or 
discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious 
views abhorrent to the authorities; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit 
the dissemination of particular religious views.  On the other hand, the 
Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to 
governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious 
beliefs or principles, for “even when the action is in accord with one’s 
religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.” 
The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some 
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.
91
 
Under Sherbert a governmental action that substantially burdens a 
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.
92
  
“The compelling interest test effectuates the First Amendment’s command 
that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred 
position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this 
liberty, whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling 
governmental interests ‘of the highest order.’”
93
  That compelling interest 
can only be met when it is “an especially important governmental interest 
pursued by narrowly tailored means. . . exacting a sacrifice of First 
Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, 
and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”
94
 
The compelling interest test announced in Sherbert was applied to a 
variety of free exercise claims
95
 until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                 
 88.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 89.  Id. at 402-04. 
 90.  Id. at 409-10. The claimant was a Seventh Day Adventist and her Sabbath fell 
on Saturdays.  
 91.  Id. at 402-03 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)) 
(citations omitted). 
 92.  Id. at 403. 
 93.  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 895 (1990) (quoting 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)). 
 94.  Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 728 (1986). 
 95.  See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205-
18
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Employment Division v. Smith, wherein Justice Scalia held that the 
compelling interest test did not reach laws of general applicability and 
neutrality such as Oregon’s indirect criminalization of the religious use of 
peyote as part of a general prohibition against the use of peyote as a 
Schedule I controlled substance.
96
 Thus, after Smith, the compelling interest 
test of Sherbert became the second step of a broader examination of the law 
in question.  Instead of requiring that the government demonstrate a 
compelling interest in all cases, the Court held that where a law was 
“neutral and of general applicability [it] need not be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect 
of burdening a particular religious practice.”
97
  If, however, the law lacked 
neutrality or was not a law of general applicability, then the government 
had to satisfy the compelling interest and narrow tailoring requirements 
announced in Sherbert in order to survive a First Amendment free exercise 
challenge.
98
  This interpretation was not without dissenters, in particular 
Justice Souter, who laid out a deeper analysis of the concepts of formal and 
substantive neutrality as part of a larger discussion of the interpretation of 





The Religious Freedom Restoration Act was passed in 1993 in direct 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.
100
  Congress sought to 
                                                 
206. 
 96.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85. 
 97.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. 872).   
 98. The Court stated that: 
Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent 
in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the 
other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored 
to advance that interest.  
See id. at 530-33. 
 99.  Justice Souter took time to parse the Court’s opinions in multiple free exercise 
cases and made the argument that Smith oversimplified the then existing Free Exercise 
jurisprudence.  His position was that the Free Exercise Clause did not simply require 
facial neutrality but rather substantive neutrality such that the impact of a government 
regulation was subject to the more stringent test of Sherbert rather than the formal 
neutrality test set forth in Smith.  Id. at 559-77 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 100.  See Religious Freedom Restoration Act 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).  
Both Houses of Congress held hearings at which witnesses testified about the 
practical implications of the Smith decision and criticized its historical and 
19
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reinstate the Sherbert test and require that the government continue to 
demonstrate both a compelling interest and the use of least restrictive 
means when a government law or regulation had an impact on religion.
101
  
RFRA was a Congressional affirmation of the freedom-protective 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, and a disavowal of the 
discrimination view of the Free Exercise Clause offered in Smith.
102
 
In 1997, the question of whether RFRA was constitutional as applied to 
the states came before the Supreme Court.
103
  The case, City of Boerne v. 
Flores, involved the denial of a Catholic church’s building permit 
application because the church was located in a historic district.
104
  The 
church challenged the permit denial under RFRA.
105
  The Supreme Court 
found that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states because it 
exceeded the scope of Congress’s power under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent or remediate state discrimination.
106
  In 
considering the impact and breadth of RFRA, Justice Kennedy observed 
that: 
The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a 
heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their 
traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in 
Smith. Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state 
laws likely to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of    religion 
. . . RFRA’s substantial-burden test . . . is not even a discriminatory 
effects or disparate-impact test.  It is a reality of the modern regulatory 
state that numerous state laws, such as the zoning regulations at issue 
here, impose a substantial burden on a large class of individuals.  When 
the exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law 
of general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have 
been burdened any more than other citizens, let alone burdened because 
of their religious beliefs. In addition, the Act imposes in every case a 
least restrictive means requirement—a requirement that was not used in 
the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify—which also 
                                                 
jurisprudential underpinnings.
 
 As the Supreme Court later noted, members of 
Congress debated the ‘points of constitutional interpretation’ raised by the Smith 
decision, and many ‘criticized the Court’s reasoning.’
 
After due consideration, the 
House of Representatives passed RFRA unanimously and the Senate did so by a 
vote of 97-3. See McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 84, at 160.   
 101.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
 102.  See McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 84, at 157, 160. 
 103.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507-508 (1997). 
 104.  Id. at 507. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Id. at 507-08. 
20
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indicates that the legislation is broader than is appropriate if the goal is to 
prevent and remedy constitutional violations.
107
 
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens observed that RFRA operated as a 
preference for religion rather than a protection of religious freedom in the 
face of otherwise neutral legislation.
108
 
RFRA remains viable with respect to actions taken by the federal 
government, and the Supreme Court has confirmed the more exacting 
nature of the test under RFRA, as laid out in Sherbert, is still the prevailing 
test.
109
  It is a test that is wholly centered on the impact a law that is 
otherwise neutral and of general applicability has on the person impacted in 
the context of the alleged burden.
110
  The Supreme Court’s current view 
also reflects the position that uniformity alone, as a governmental interest, 
cannot be compelling in and of itself despite pre-Smith cases that appear to 
suggest the contrary.
111
  However, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that 
when a religious exemption would seriously compromise a program’s 




C. Hobby Lobby 
The issue in Hobby Lobby was the application of a certain provision of 
the Affordable Care Act that required insurance plans and insurers to 
provide preventive care to women without cost sharing requirements.
113
  
                                                 
 107.  Id. at 534-35. 
 108.  Id. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 109.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
439 (2006). 
 110.  See id. at 430-31 (“RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the 
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law “to the 
person”—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being 
substantially burdened.”). 
 111.  Id. at 435.  The Supreme Court noted that cases like United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 252, 252 (1982), which denied a request for a religious exemption to pay Social 
Security taxes, and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 599 (1961), which denied a 
request for a religious exemption from a day of rest for workers, did not stand for the 
proposition that a general interest in uniformity justified a substantial burden on 
religion.  Instead, Justice Roberts observed that “[t]hese cases show that the 
Government can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a 
particular program by offering evidence that granting the requested religious 
accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to administer the program.”  
Id. 
 112.  Id. at 435. 
 113.  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1283 (W.D. 
Okla. 2012) rev’d and remanded 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) aff’d sub nom. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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Specifically, the Affordable Care Act provided that: 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide 
coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for . . . 
(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and 
screenings . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by 




The comprehensive guidelines, in turn, incorporated the following 
provisions for contraceptive care for women that must be provided without 
cost sharing: “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive 
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for 
all women with reproductive capacity.”
115
   These contraceptive methods 
included “diaphragms, oral contraceptive pills, emergency contraceptives 
such as Plan B and ulipristal, commonly known as the morning-after pill 
and the week-after pill, respectively, and intrauterine devices.”
116
 
Hobby Lobby, a private, closely held corporation
117
 and its individual 
owners sued the federal government in federal district court in Oklahoma 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Free Exercise Clause 
and RFRA claiming that the contraceptive mandate violated both the 
corporation’s and the individuals’ religious beliefs.
118
  While Hobby Lobby 
is a secular corporation, its owners have chosen to conduct their business in 
accordance with their Christian faith, which does not permit them to 
support the provision of “abortion-inducing” medications or devices such 
as the morning after pill, the week-after pill, or intrauterine devices.
119
  
                                                 
 114. Id. at 1283 (quoting the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)). 
 115. Id. at 1283-84 (citing 76 Fed. Reg. 466231; 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2012)). 
 116. Id. at 1284. 
 117. See id. at 1278. Hobby Lobby and another corporation, Mardel, are both wholly 
owned by the Green family.  While both corporations were part of the suit, the case will 
be discussed largely with reference to Hobby Lobby for the sake of clarity.   
 118.  See id. 
 119.  Id. at 1285.   
The Greens operate Hobby Lobby and Mardel through a management trust (of 
which each Green is a trustee), and that trust is likewise governed by religious 
principles. The trust exists “to honor God with all that has been entrusted” to 
the Greens and to ‘use the Green family assets to create, support, and leverage 
the efforts of Christian ministries.’ The trustees must sign ‘a Trust 
Commitment,’ which among other things requires them to affirm the Green 
family statement of faith and to ‘regularly seek to maintain a close intimate 
walk with the Lord Jesus Christ by regularly investing time in His Word and 
prayer.’   
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. 
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) and aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
22
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While the Affordable Care Act grandfathered in certain health plans and 
provided a safe harbor for religious employers, Hobby Lobby did not 
qualify under either protection and was subject to the full force of non-
compliance with the Affordable Care Act, which equated to fines of 
approximately 1.3 million dollars per day.
120
 
The District Court first found that the corporation did not have a 
constitutional right to free exercise of religion because the Constitution 
reserves that right to individuals.
121
  The court noted that the one exception 
to this had been the extension of free exercise rights to churches, religious 
organizations, and religious corporations “because believers ‘exercise their 
religion through religious organizations.’”
122
  Ultimately, the court found 
that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits 
with respect to their constitutional free exercise claim.
123
 
With respect to the RFRA claim, the court first needed to determine 
whether a corporation was a person for the purposes of RFRA.
124
  The 
statute itself contains no definition, so the plaintiffs argued the dictionary 
act definition of person, which included corporations, should apply.
125
 
However the application of this definition was supposed to be taken in 
context, and the District Court found that, in this instance, the context was 
not appropriate for the application of the dictionary definition found in 1 
U.S.C. § 1.
126
  The District Court held that:  “[t]he same reasons behind the 
court’s conclusion that secular, for-profit corporations do not have First 
Amendment rights under the Free Exercise Clause support a determination 
that they are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the RFRA.”
127
 The court went on 
to find that neither the corporations nor the individual owners could 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and the motion for 
preliminary injunction was denied.
128
 
                                                 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 120.  Hobby Lobby, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 1285. 
 121.  Id. at 1288. 
 122.  Id. (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J. concurring)). 
 123.  Id. at 1290. 
 124.  Id. at 1291. 
 125.  Id. (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 101, which states, “In determining the meaning of any 
Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and 
‘whoever’ includes corporations. . . as well as individuals.”)). 
 126.  Id. (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993)). 
 127.  Id. at 1291-92. 
 128.  Id. at 1291, 1294, 1296.  With respect to the individual owners, the court found 
that they could not demonstrate a substantial burden on their religious beliefs.  Id. at 
1296. 
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The Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, finding that 
corporations were entitled to maintain free exercise claims and are persons 
under RFRA.
129
  With respect to RFRA, the Tenth Circuit simply applied 
the Dictionary Act.
130
  And, with respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the 
court found that historically the First Amendment had been applied to 
corporations, and that the Free Exercise Clause itself had been applied to 
corporations of a non-profit nature, as well as individuals who maintained 
for-profit businesses.
131
  Thus, as the Tenth Circuit viewed the problem, the 
government’s position that corporations could not maintain an action under 
RFRA or seek protection under the Free Exercise clause was untenable.
132
  
The court observed:  
In short, individuals may incorporate for religious purposes and keep 
their Free Exercise rights, and unincorporated individuals may pursue 
profit while keeping their Free Exercise rights. With these propositions, 
the government does not seem to disagree. The problem for the 
government, it appears, is when individuals incorporate and fail to 




The Supreme Court granted certiorari and arguments were heard on 
March 25, 2014, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores.
134
 Justice Alito first 
addressed the nature of a corporation, clarifying that a corporation is 
nothing more than a collection of the persons who own it and, as such, is 
nothing more than, in essence, an artificial alter ego of those persons: 
A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to 
achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and 
obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and 
employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another.  
When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to 
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.  For 
example, extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations 
                                                 
 129.  Hobby Lobby Stores v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 2013).  
We hold that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are entitled to bring claims under 
RFRA, have established a likelihood of success that their rights under this 
statute are substantially burdened by the contraceptive-coverage requirement, 
and have established an irreparable harm.  But we remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings on two of the remaining factors governing 
the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction. 
Id. at 1121. 
 130.  Id. at 1116. 
 131.  Id. at 1133-34. 
 132.  Id. at 1136-37. 
 133.  Id. at 1134. 
 134.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2751 (2014). 
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protects the privacy interests of employees and others associated with the 
company.  Protecting corporations from government seizure of their 
property without just compensation protects all those who have a stake in 
the corporations’ financial well-being.  And protecting the free-exercise 
rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel 




The majority found that corporations exercise the same religious beliefs 
as their owners, at least in the context of a closely-held corporation.
136
  
Interestingly, to some extent the Court recognized that corporations, as 
legal entities, have religious beliefs by finding that corporations are simply 
an expression of their owners’ religious beliefs.  But then the Court found 
that corporations were persons for the purposes of RFRA.
137
  And, of 
course, the majority included other stakeholders in its definition but then 
disregarded lack of uniformity to the extent it did not converge with that 
definition. 
The distinction at the heart of Hobby Lobby, however, was not whether a 
corporation is a person, but whether a corporation can “exercise” religious 
beliefs in the same way a person can.
138
  Clearly, the owners of Hobby 
Lobby, Mardel Books, and Conestoga Woods can have religious beliefs 
and exercise them.  Similarly, the employees of these companies can have 
religious beliefs and exercise them.  The question is whether these 
corporations, made up of more than one individual, can hold and exercise 
religious beliefs in the same manner.  The majority relied on decisions 
wherein non-profit corporations have been given religious rights, as have 
individuals conducting for-profit businesses to find that the for-profit 
corporate form was entitled to similar protection.
139
 
While the majority recognized that for-profit corporations could have 
religious beliefs, it stopped short of extending recognition of such beliefs to 
public corporations, or corporations that were not closely -held, because 
those corporations would arguably lack a certain unity of religious belief.
140
  
The dissent took issue with this and the potential problems that were 
evident.  Where will the line be drawn between closely held and public?  
Will a majority of shareholders or an active board of directors be enough to 
provide the appropriate religious imprimatur on the corporation in 
question? 
                                                 
 135.  Id. at 2768. 
 136.  See id. at 2755. 
 137.  See id. at 2768-69. 
 138.  See id. at 2769. 
 139.  See id. at 2768-70. 
 140.  See id. at 2769, 2771, 2774. 
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Ultimately, the Court found that providing mandatory health insurance 
coverage that included abortifacient contraception substantially burdened 
the objectors’ religious beliefs and that by having multiple exceptions and 
accommodations the government had demonstrated less restrictive means 
for providing coverage to female employees.
141
  The Court also noted that, 
from the female employees’ perspective, the net result was the same.
142
  
The women would have access to the subject contraceptive coverage 
through other means.  From a vulnerability perspective then, it could be 
said that extending religious beliefs to the corporations involved did not 
prevent other vulnerable subjects within the corporation from obtaining a 
desirable physical asset because it was still available.  The state could 
provide resilience through alternate means to the same population without 
damaging the existential asset of the corporate owners while still utilizing 
the corporate form as the framework for services.  The Court itself noted 
the narrow scope of its ruling in this regard, stating “our decision in these 
cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate. Our decision 
should not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate must 
necessarily fall if it conflicts with an employer’s religious beliefs.”
143
  
However, as the dissent demonstrated, and more recent cases have borne 
out, the notion of resorting to alternate channels to provide services outside 
the corporate structure for those within still creates significant real world 
problems. 
The dissent in Hobby Lobby raised the specter of the policy problems, 
both real and potential, that would arise from the majority’s decision.
144
  
The dissent highlighted the slippery slope that had just been crafted from a 
broad interpretation of the reach of RFRA and the recognition of corporate 
personhood.
145
  Justice Ginsburg framed the problem as one where the 
government will now always be compelled to apply the less restrictive 
alternative regardless of the compelling government interests or the 
disparate impact on those who lose a privilege based solely on another’s 
sincerely held religious beliefs.
146
  And now those religious beliefs include 
the beliefs of a corporation as an autonomous entity, based upon the 
corporation’s ownership structure.  In real terms, Justice Ginsburg 
explained, the majority’s decision meant that “[t]he exemption sought by 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga would override significant interests of the 
                                                 
 141.  See id. at 2779-80. 
 142.  See id. at 2782. 
 143.  See id. at 2783. 
 144.  See id. at 2790-92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
   145.  See id. at 2787. 
 146.  See id.  
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corporations’ employees and covered dependents. It would deny legions of 
women who do not hold their employers’ beliefs access to contraceptive 
coverage that the ACA would otherwise secure.”
147
 
Justice Ginsburg also expressed concern over the majority’s decision that 
RFRA, as amended by RLUIPA, charted a new legal course away from 
First Amendment jurisprudence to give even more religious freedoms than 
were constitutionally provided.
148
  The majority read RFRA’s new 
definition as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief” to be a complete divestiture from 
First Amendment case law.
149
  In Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, this language 
was designed to clarify that the courts should not question the asserted 
religious belief, not that the courts should wholly abandon the Sherbert line 
of cases in favor of a more expansive view of religious liberties.
150
 
Beyond the expanded reading of RFRA, Justice Ginsburg expressed 
serious concerns about extending religious rights to corporations and the 
precedent that was being set.
151
  She observed that:  
Until this litigation, no decision of this Court recognized a for-profit 
corporation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally 
applicable law, whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.  The 
absence of such precedent is just what one would expect, for the exercise 
of religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal 
entities.
152
   
Ginsburg predicted that RFRA claims would proliferate because “the 
Court’s expansive notion of corporate personhood—combined with its 
other errors in construing RFRA—invites for-profit entities to seek 




The only good thing about the majority’s choice to rely so heavily on 
RFRA is that it is completely within the power of Congress to roll back the 
broadest definitions of RFRA, or remove it altogether, as the Supreme 
Court has functionally decoupled it from First Amendment jurisprudence. 
                                                 
 147.  Id. at 2790. 
 148.  See id. at 2792. 
 149.  Id. at 2792 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012)). RFRA’s definition 
was amended when RLUIPA was passed and the noted language was added. Id. 
 150.  See id. 
 151.  See id. at 2797.  
 152.  Id. at 2794. 
 153.  Id. at 2797. 
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D. The Impact of a New Judicial View of Corporate Personhood 
1. Critiques of Hobby Lobby 
The majority in Hobby Lobby came to the conclusion that a corporation 
was nothing more than a “simple” form of organization to achieve the 
desired ends of the people who are associated with that corporation.  In that 
context, extending constitutional rights to a corporation is simply 
recognition of the constitutional rights of the people within that 
corporation.  Scholars continue to debate how this issue should be resolved 
and whether this simple statement is a correct expression of the law or 
policy.
154




First, regardless of how “corporation” was defined by the Court, the only 
religious rights that were recognized in Hobby Lobby were those of the 
owners of the corporation.  Second, corporations have been specifically 
designed to be separate legal entities for a reason.  Corporations may be 
driven by a stated purpose or mission; but, corporations are supposed to 
exist in a legal construct apart from their owners and employees, regardless 
of whether they are contemplated as fictional entities or as real entities.  If 
                                                 
 154.  Thad Eagles, Free Exercise, Inc.: A New Framework for Adjudicating 
Corporate Religious Liberty Claims, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 625 (2015); see also 
Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 64-69 (2013) 
(conflating the corporation and its owners, as if corporations themselves could believe 
anything); Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS 
Mandate, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 589, 620-30 (2014) (arguing that the right of religious 
exercise extends to corporations themselves and not just individuals); Elissa Graves, 
The Corporate Right to Free Exercise of Religion: The Affordable Care Act and the 
Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 199, 211-16 (2014) 
(arguing that corporations exercise the religious beliefs of their owners); Mark L. 
Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 59, 63-64 (2013) (arguing that for-profit corporations can exercise 
religion). But see Gregory P. Magarian, Hobby Lobby in Constitutional Waters: Two 
Life Rings and an Anchor, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 67, 72 (2014) (arguing that 
corporations cannot “manifest conscience”); Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has 
No Soul—The Business Entity Law Response to Challenges to the PPACA 
Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014) (“[A] business 
organization does not have religious beliefs.”). 
 155.  Eagles suggests that the appropriate question, the one that should have been 
more clearly addressed by the Court in Hobby Lobby, was about whether “regulatory 
burdens on corporations can substantially burden the free exercise of individuals’ 
religions, and that courts should not ignore that potential burden simply because the 
directly regulated party is a corporation.”  In other words, Eagles advocates disposing 
with the corporate form in answering the broader question of whether a business 
regulation substantially burdens an individual’s exercise of religion. Eagles, supra note 
154, at 593. 
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it were otherwise, then corporations would enjoy all of the same 
constitutional protections as their owners, as contemplated by the nexus of 
contracts theory.  If this were the case, there would be no need to ever 
pierce the corporate veil, because such a thing would simply not exist, and 
thus there would be no need to reverse-pierce the corporate veil to allow 
certain classes of corporate owners to exercise their religious rights.
156
 
The other problem with the logic of Hobby Lobby is that it ignores the 
very real world problem of conflicting beliefs held by owners, 
shareholders, and employees.  In some respects, the case was an easy one 
because there was a unity of religious belief at the ownership level in a 
closely held corporation, but what if there isn’t the same unity of belief in 
the next case? What if the corporation itself acknowledges a religious belief 
that does not reflect that of the owners, but has an end that supports the 
underlying goal of the corporation to be profitable?  And even if the 
opposing view is taken, that corporate form should be irrelevant in deciding 
whether a business regulation impermissibly impacts an individuals’ 
religion, how should the state balance competing vulnerabilities where the 
state regulation serves a compelling interest? 
One troubling aspect, from a vulnerability perspective, is the assignment 
of an embodied trait to a legally created person.  Embodiment and 
embeddedness are distinct, and the scholars that argue that blurring that 
line is problematic have a point.
157
  There is a genuine concern that the door 
that has swung open to address discrimination by individual corporate 
actors will now swing the other way in the name of religious freedom.
158
  
While most of the talk in this capacity has been with respect to LGBTQ 
rights and state-enacted RFRAs, more subtle religious challenges such as 
providing for healthcare for a pregnancy conceived out of wedlock are not 
beyond cavil.  While pregnancy discrimination is prohibited, such 
discrimination has not been challenged on religious grounds.  Kent 
Greenfield comes from a different perspective, however, in that he believes 
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions call for “[m]ore corporate 
personhood, not less.”
159
  His concern with the debate over corporate 
                                                 
 156.  See Mohapatra, supra note 8, at 170-74. 
 157. See generally Matambanadzo, supra note 71 (applying vulnerability analysis 
and the concept of embodiment to the legal definition of person).   
 158.  Stephanie Wang, What the Religious Freedom Really Means for Indiana, INDY 
STAR, Apr. 3, 2015, http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/29/religious-
freedom-law-really-means-indiana/70601584/. 
 159.  Kent Greenfield, Let Us Praise Corporate Persons, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, 
Jan/Feb. 2015, 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/januaryfebruary_2015/features/let_us_n
ow_praise_corporate_pe053466.php?page=all. Greenfield argues, in part, that “[t]he 
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personhood and the extreme notion of a “corporation is not a person” is that 




2.  Limits of Hobby Lobby (or Lack Thereof) 
Two post-Hobby Lobby cases further illustrate the fault lines that 
develop in balancing vulnerabilities of different constituencies.  In both 
cases, the complaining parties argued that requiring them to be attached to 
the mandate in any way, in these specific cases by requiring them to 
affirmatively “opt out” of the mandate, created a substantial burden on their 
religious beliefs. 
In Priests For Life v. United States Department of Health & Human 
Services
161
 the D.C. Circuit observed that the case was  
paradoxical and virtually unprecedented . . . [and] analogous to a 
religious conscientious objector to a military draft claiming that the act 
of identifying himself as such on his Selective Service card constitutes a 
substantial burden because that identification would then ‘trigger’ the 
draft of a fellow selective service registrant in his place and thereby 
implicate the objector in facilitating war.
162
   
The D.C. Circuit Court found that “Religious objectors do not suffer 
substantial burdens under RFRA where the only harm to them is that they 
sincerely feel aggrieved by their inability to prevent what other people 
would do to fulfill regulatory objectives after they opt out.”
163
  The Court 
also stated that “They have no RFRA right to be free from the unease, or 
even anguish, of knowing that third parties are legally privileged or 
obligated to act in ways their religion abhors.”
164
  The court, citing the 
Supreme Court, recited a simple yet powerful premise, “Government 
simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s 
                                                 
best way to constrain corporations is to require them to sign on to a more robust social 
contract and to govern themselves more pluralistically—mechanisms designed to 
mimic the traits of human personhood within the corporate form.”  Greenfield sees 
great value in the “real entity” theory and argues for more democratic governance 
within corporations themselves, debunking the notion of shareholder primacy in favor 
of a more human and humane version of corporate governance.   
 160.  See id. 
 161.  772 F.3d 229, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded by Zubik v. 
Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
 162.  Id. at 246 (citing Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 
2014) cert granted, judgment vacated by Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
1528 (2015) (Supreme Court vacated for further consideration based on its decision in 
Hobby Lobby).   
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
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religious needs and desires.”
165
  The truth is the collective good must trump 
individual need at some point if society is to survive.
166
 
However, in Catholic Benefits Association LCA v. Burwell,
167
 the 
Western District of Oklahoma agreed with the Eleventh Circuit which had 
previously found that even if the opt-out form alone didn’t trigger RFRA 
coverage, the government had required the objector to “participate” in the 
mandate scheme by requiring it to deliver a notice to its third party 
administrator or insurer which was a sufficient burden on the objector’s 
religious beliefs.
168
  The court found that the mere fact that the plaintiffs 
had to affirmatively notify the government by filling out a form caused a 
substantial burden on their religious beliefs that was not the least restrictive 
means of doing so.  However, the court also side-stepped one big issue 
because it found that a majority of the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby had 
not decided that the government had a compelling interest in issuing the 
mandate in the first place.
169
 
These cases highlight a slightly different issue than that presented in 
Hobby Lobby in that they do not involve the corporate form and corporate 
personhood.  Nonetheless they are contextually relevant in considering the 
very real problems confronted by the state in building resilience through 
corporations, often in the employment context.  The degree to which the 
state chooses to protect individual exercise of religion creates a very real 
                                                 
 165.  Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 
(1988)). In Lyng, certain Native Americans argued that timber harvesting on land 
which they used for religious purposes violated their free exercise rights, and the court 
made a distinction between government regulation that caused an individual to behave 
in a way that violated their religious beliefs versus government conduct that simply 
made exercising those beliefs more difficult. See Lyng v. NW Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988). 
 166.  Interestingly the Supreme Court found a way to accommodate both sides’ 
concerns in this case through a compromise of sorts, based on the changed positions of 
the parties after oral arguments before the Court.  Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560.  In Zubik, 
the matter was remanded for the parties to fashion a remedy whereby the petitioners no 
longer had to affirmatively opt out of contraceptive care, “while at the same time 
ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health 
coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’”  In reaching this compromise, the Court 
did not decide “whether petitioners’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened, 
whether the Government has a compelling interest, or whether the current regulations 
are the least restrictive means of serving that interest.”  Id. 
 167.  81 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (W.D. Okla. 2014).   
 168.  Id. (citing Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of the United States 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 756 F.3d 1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 2014)). 
 169.  Id. at 1272-4.; see also Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, No. 14-2726, 2015 WL 
5449504 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. DHS, No. 14-1507, 2015 
WL 5449491 (8th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015). 
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tension between the common good and individual rights.  The government 
itself has created this tension, passing RFRA when the Supreme Court 
effectively situated Free Exercise in a space that would have better 
balanced the common good with individual existential needs.  Now that 
RFRA is law, and has been interpreted in the broadest manner, any 
government action that in any way impacts religious belief may be subject 
to challenge and impeded in its implementation.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision to extend RFRA beyond natural persons to for-profit corporations 
and to extend the concept of corporate personhood is likely to further 
exacerbate this problem. 
V. THE ROLE OF THE RESPONSIVE STATE IN MEDIATING CORPORATE 
PERSONHOOD 
Much of the resilience of corporations is built upon the oft-ignored 
contribution of those who labor on their behalf as well as the privileges 
afforded to corporations under the current legal system based on a lax 
regulatory scheme.
170
  Thus, corporations are comprised of those whose 
vulnerabilities are not similarly situated.  The responsive state needs to 
address these disparities in vulnerability, because these disparities are 
exacerbated by the inequities in power that exist in the corporate structure.  
The state can mediate such disparities in many ways, but one question is 
how to address competition for acquisition of assets that are required for 
resilience. 
In Hobby Lobby, the owners of the company were trying to protect an 
existential asset.  There was and is a valid religious reason for their 
decision to decline to offer certain types of contraceptives to their female 
employees.  The owners were not preventing their employees from using 
such contraception, they were not removing preventive care from these 
employees, nor were they denying access to all contraception, instead they 
deliberately drew a line between what they felt was appropriate and what 
                                                 
 170.  Fineman observes that “in the market context, we need to be reminded that 
corporations and those who run, direct, and profit from them cannot function without 
the labor of others.”  FINEMAN, supra note 47 at 289.  A perfect example of this 
invisible resilience is the labor of undocumented workers whose efforts help drive our 
economy, but whose presence is met with disdain from those who benefit from their 
labor.  Kasperkvic cites to studies that indicate deporting all undocumented workers 
and closing our borders “would ‘reduce the [United States gross domestic product] by 
1.46% annually[,] or $2.6 trillion . . . over ten years.’”  Jana Kasperkvic, These States 
Will Lose Billions If Their Illegal Immigrants Are Deported, BUS. INSIDER, (Jan. 23, 
2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/illegal-immigrants-deported-2012-1; 
see also Giving the Facts a Fighting Chance: Addressing Common Questions on 
Immigration, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/high-school/top-10-myths-about-immigration. 
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was not.  However, their decisions, both before and after the Affordable 
Care Act mandate, impacted their female employees’ resilience, through 
their access to physical assets, in a tangible way. 
By the same token, the Greens’ employees were trying to build resilience 
through acquisition of a physical asset.  This type of healthcare has a direct 
impact on the woman who chooses to use it, but it has a much broader 
impact on society as a whole because it is intimately related to family 
planning, child care, housing, and every other metric of support required to 
raise children.  However, but for the government’s mandate, these 
employees might not have been able to obtain the resilience provided by 
the mandate.  “The link between the ACA Contraceptive Mandate and the 
Green family’s religious beliefs is tenuous at best. However, to the 15,000 
employees who would receive comprehensive health-care coverage were it 




Prior to the mandate, the state had not interceded in this juxtaposition of 
privilege and interests; after the mandate, the state chose to bolster the 
resilience and privilege of existential assets over the need for more 
immediate physical assets when it recognized the Greens’ tenuous religious 
liberty interests.  The government, in a responsive posture, was seeking to 
provide a physical asset to many Americans, expanding healthcare and 
access to healthcare.  In attempting to accomplish this goal, the state sought 
to use the corporation as an institution as an efficient means of delivering 
this asset to the population.  Because the government has permitted both 
corporations and the healthcare system to develop in certain ways, it has 
now created a circumstance whereby a means to deliver resilience to its 
constituency may be largely foreclosed.  The problem is, given the current 




Here, the privileged employer seeks to protect the outer boundary of an 
existential asset.  And a less privileged employee, who is vulnerable within 
the corporate structure, seeks to capture a physical asset that has a 
significant impact and benefit far beyond her own health and well-being.  
The state, in an attempt to mediate between the established asset and the 
newly captured asset, fails in protecting the more vulnerable of the two.  Is 
this part of the process?  Is this just how it goes sometimes?  Should we 
have a hierarchical assumption of how assets should be distributed?  Is the 
                                                 
 171.  Mohapatra, supra note 8, at 161. 
 172.  See id. at 155. There has been at least some Congressional attempt to reinstate 
the mandate after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby.  See id. (citing Protect 
Women’s Health from Corporate Interference Act of 2014, S. 2578, 113th Cong. § 2 
(2014)). 
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answer simply to federalize healthcare and spread the cost of healthcare 
among all of us and remove healthcare from the private/public equation?  
Maybe. 
When assessing these issues, it is worth considering how healthcare 
became embedded in the employment environment in the first place.  W. 
David Koeninger has recently reviewed the historical evolution of state, 
corporation, employment and healthcare in discussing the Affordable Care 
Act.
173
  The common story about healthcare in the United States is that 
post-World War II labor unions and large corporations agreed, based upon 
their mutual interests, to institute employer health care plans.
174
  Koeninger 
explains that it did not start out that way, both companies and labor unions 
had their own medical services, but after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Inland Steel, health benefits became a part of collective bargaining and 
labor unions abandoned the idea of government-sponsored health 
insurance.
175
  Because employers controlled access to health care for many 




The development of health care in this manner led to a system of “path 
dependence” wherein an individual’s choices were absent from the process; 
if you were able-bodied you obtained health insurance through work, if you 
were otherwise frail, you obtained health insurance through the federal 
system.
177
  In fact, the historical underpinnings of the healthcare system 
prior to the Affordable Care Act had distinct racial undertones and a clear 
distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor.
178
  The “notion 
that an employer or governmental authority could define health for the 
purpose of taking advantage of an individual’s labor power has been woven 
into our health care system for 150 years.”
179
 The Affordable Care Act 
challenged this system of path-dependence, and has even been identified as 
this era’s civil rights legislation.
180
  Koeninger has suggested defending the 
Affordable Care Act as anti-subordination legislation based on the racially 
                                                 
 173.  Koeninger, supra note 11, at 203-4 
 174.  Id. at 201. 
 175.  Id. at 206-07. 
 176.  See id. at 207. 
 177.  Id. at 201-02 (citing Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 431, 439 n.31 (2011)). 
 178.  Id. at 205-6 (citing JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM:  AFRICAN AMERICAN 
ILLNESS AND SUFFERING DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 42-52 (2012)). 
 179.  Id. at 204. 
 180.  Id. at 202 (citing JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 
305 (2011)). 
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skewed history of healthcare in this country.
181
 
Regardless of how it is viewed, the Affordable Care Act took a privilege 
held by employers and created a system whereby employees could obtain 
health insurance outside the employment context as well as receiving 
mandatory benefits within it.  Even if it was limited in some respects, it 
was the action of a responsive state.  However, the state response unearthed 
a new set of vulnerabilities that had otherwise lay dormant due to the 
privilege employers enjoyed with respect to healthcare.  Since the 
Affordable Care Act’s enactment, employers have been faced with a new 
reality—their privilege has been diminished and some balance has been 
restored to the inequities in the system.  Thinking through those 
vulnerabilities and their practical impact highlights the choices that need to 
be made between competing assets and resources. 
Hobby Lobby was wrongly decided on a corporate personhood basis, not 
because corporate personhood is bad, but because it blurred the line 
between corporate personhood and individuals in a way that was both 
expansive and limiting.  This level of individuation of corporations further 
exacerbates a systemic imbalance that will make the delivery of any assets 
and resources by a responsive state more complicated.  The state cannot 
have it both ways.  In enacting RFRA, the state sought to provide even 
more protection for religious liberties but, in doing so, it exposed both itself 
and other institutions that normally would provide resilience to a harmful 
limiting principle. By further restricting its responsiveness when it conflicts 
with an existential asset, the state has created a model that may never be 
able to efficiently provide the appropriate measure of resilience. 
In terms of balancing vulnerabilities and resilience there is also another 
limiting principle that should be addressed, the delivery of existential assets 
via state response must cede to the need for physical assets. This is not to 
suggest there should be a strict hierarchy among vulnerabilities, they are all 
interdependent, but balance must be achieved in a manner that makes sense 
– one that addresses our embodied nature first, before addressing our 
embedded one.  In this instance it may mean many potential solutions for 
the problems that have arisen with the provision of health care and the 
protection of religious liberties but the obvious one is for universal health 
care, or at least a reworking of RFRA and a return to the Smith 
jurisprudence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Greenfield was right when he observed that corporate personhood has 
great value, but that value does not supplant the need to regulate.  As 
                                                 
 181.  Id. at 203. 
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government moves to regulate, and to address some of the inequities within 
society, it will have to mediate between competing vulnerabilities in a 
meaningful way.  Government needs to fill the vacuum left by collective 
workers’ movements led by labor unions and seek to meet corporations 
where their interests diverge from that of the vulnerable subjects in their 
midst.  The political will to do so will be the sticking point.  Clearly, as 
legally created entities, corporations are still subject to government 
regulation and, as Greenfield is quick to point out, perhaps leaving 
religious liberties where they are — where corporation meets society — is 
better and we should focus on the other part of the equation, the 




                                                 
 182.  See generally Greenfield, supra note 159. 
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